



ASSESSING STUDENTS’ EQUALITY OF 
OPPORTUNITY IN OECD COUNTRIES:  
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL  
AND SCHOOL-LEVEL POLICIES  
Michele Raitano 
Sapienza University of Rome 
Francesco Vona 






























 Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
2 
Assessing students’ equality of opportunity in OECD countries:  
the role of national and school-level policies  
 
 
Michele Raitano  
Sapienza University of Rome 
 
Francesco Vona  




This paper analyses the relationship between equality of opportunities and characteristics of the 
educational systems, jointly considering country- and school-level features. Because the peer group 
composition represents a fundamental channel in shaping educational opportunities, we consider all 
policies, surveyed in the PISA 2006 dataset, that affect the sorting of students to schools. Our 
empirical analysis shows that the inclusion of sorting policies enhances the capacity of explaining the 
determinants of the socio-economic gradient with respect to previous studies including only country-
level features. In particular, it casts doubts on the prominent role attributed to school tracking. 
However sorting policies do not fully account for the influence of school composition on the socio-
economic gradient; the direct inclusion of peer variables allows to highlight the equalizing impact of 
mixing students from different backgrounds. Among the other policies, also pre-school enrolment, 
public expenditure in education and ability tracking display a significant equalizing effect. 
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1. Introduction 
Inequality in students’ performances still remains a persistent feature of modern societies 
in spite of the generalized expansion in educational attainments. Beyond differences in 
attained degrees, a large part of inequality pertains qualitative differences among attended 
schools and are related to the increased diversification of the educational offer (e.g. private vs. 
public, vocational vs. academic-oriented). From a normative standpoint, the fraction of 
educational inequality related to circumstances out of the individual responsibility, i.e. the 
family background
1, appears unacceptable. 
Standardized measures of students’ performances – collected by international assessment 
programs, e.g. PISA, PIRLS, TIMMS – offer a unique tool to analyze the issue of equality of 
opportunities looking at the effective skills of students from different family backgrounds, 
attending different schools in different countries. Additionally, international assessment 
programs contain information on policies both at the school level and, when merged with 
other datasets on education (e.g. UNESCO or OECD), at the country level. These desirable 
features make these datasets particularly suitable for analyzing the correlations between a 
given policy and the socio-economic gradient, which is identified through the family 
background effect (FBE), i.e. the estimated coefficient linking parental background to the 
student’s achievement. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationships between the socio-economic 
gradient and the features of the educational system using the PISA 2006 dataset. With respect 
to studies using comparable datasets for the same purpose (Ammermueller 2005; Hanushek 
and Wößmann 2006; Schuetz et al. 2008, Waldinger 2005), our main original contribution 
consists in broadening the set of policies that are believed to have a significant impact on 
educational inequality. In particular, following a large theoretical and empirical literature on 
peer effects (e.g. Nechyba 2006), we claim that policies affecting student sorting to schools 
are crucial determinants of the FBE, since they modify the peer group composition and the 
general learning environment. 
Factors affecting the peer group composition and the learning environment at school 
include tracking, both between-schools (i.e. the choice between vocational or general 
programmes) and within-school (i.e. grouping students by ability in all or in some subjects), 
urban segregation, school admission policies, parents’ and students’ preferences, etc. All 
these factors concur in sorting students to schools of different quality; however, the impact of 
                                                            
1. Family background could influence offspring performances directly, affecting their values and preferences, 
and indirectly, affecting the student’s sorting in the different types of schools. Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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each policy is often difficult to disentangle in a casual way by empirical analysis because 
either policies and/or initial student’s abilities are not observed (Nechyba 2006). Even if one-
to-one causal effects linking each educational policy to inequality through the peer group 
composition are difficult to disentangle, it is still possible to estimate an “ex-post” association 
between school composition variables and educational inequality.  
These insights are incorporated in our empirical strategy, which consists in comparing the 
estimates derived from two main econometric specifications. In the first, we attempt to 
decompose the level of the FBE using a set of “exogenous” country- and school-level policies 
that are known to have a direct impact on students’ sorting, namely tracking and school 
admission procedures. In the second, we directly estimate the relationship between peer level 
variables and the socio-economic gradient, also controlling for country-level features as in the 
first specification. The comparison of these two models allows to evaluate if sorting policies 
are sufficient for explaining the link between equality of opportunities and peer effects. Of 
particular interest, the estimated impact of school tracking – a variable considered crucial in 
previous studies on equality of opportunity in education (Brunello and Checchi 2007, Schuetz 
et el. 2008) – becomes statistically not significant when the peer variables are explicitly 
added.  
More in general, the inclusion of peer variables substantially enhances the understanding 
of the determinants of the socio-economic gradient. Although the PISA dataset does not offer 
reliable identification strategy for the peer effects
2, we believe that including these variables 
consents to assess the interesting correlation between a “broad contextual effect” and the 
socio-economic gradient and, further, adds explanatory power to our regressions. Having in 
mind this caveat, we keep talking of “peer effects” rather than of “contextual effects” in order 
to simplify the exposition. 
This paper departs from comparable studies such as works of Schuetz et el. (2008) and 
Brunello and Checchi (2007), in two respects. First, these studies focus only on the effect of 
country-level characteristics and policies on the socio-economic gradient, whereas we attempt 
to explain the FBE also considering policies and features affecting students sorting at the 
school level. Second, among these sorting policies we do not include only tracking among 
different school programs (i.e. general vs. vocational), but we consider a broader set of 
                                                            
2. In particular, it does not offer an identification strategy that consents to copy with the well-known endogeneity 
of the peer effects. The only possibility in the PISA dataset is to claim that this endogeneity problem can be 
substantially mitigated by adding variables related to the sorting of students to schools, such as school-level 
effects and admission policies at the school level. This claim has been used by Rangvid-Schindler (2007) and 
Schneeweiss and Winter-Ebmer (2007). Assessing students’equality of opportunity in OECD countries : the role of national and school-level policies 
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channels affecting the peer group composition (e.g. the school admission procedures and how 
students are tracked by ability inside the school).  
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
theoretical link between policies affecting peer group composition and educational inequality. 
Section 3 presents the dataset and introduces the main variables of interest. Section 4 offers a 
preliminary analysis of the relationship between sorting policies and peer variables. Section 5 
describes the econometric strategy, whereas section 6 shows the results and section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Policies affecting the peer group composition  
In both theoretical and empirical literature on peer effects, the impact of peer composition 
has been mainly analyzed in relation to the issue of maximizing the stock of human capital. 
The key finding of this literature is that alternative ways of sorting heterogeneous students 
affect the aggregate level of human capital only if peer effects enter non-linearly in the 
schooling production function (Benabou 1996, Hoxby 2000). With respect to inequality, 
theoretical predictions are more straightforward since the equalizing effect of more 
heterogeneous classes does not hinge upon the shape of the educational production function 
(e.g. de Bartolome 1990, Durlauf 1994, Benabou 1996, Fernandez and Rogerson 1996)
3. On 
one hand, if the transfer of knowledge depends upon personal interactions, a low ability 
student benefits from the interaction with a high ability student, which in turn would have 
been better off by interacting with peers at its level. On the other hand, teachers should adapt 
to a more heterogeneous class setting higher (resp. lower) targets than the ones prevailing in a 
class with only low (resp. high) ability students. 
Since peer group composition is largely endogenous, the existing empirical literature has 
mainly analyzed the indirect impact of policies affecting it. Among these policies, vast 
empirical evidence shows that postponing the choice of school offering different programmes 
reduces the effect of parental background on students’ choices and attainments (see Meghir 
and Palme 2005, Dustmann 2004, Checchi and Flabbi 2005 and works quoted in Brunello and 
Checchi 2007). In systems tracking students earlier, parental influence on students’ choices is 
                                                            
3. From the empirical side, it is not clear whether the levelling of educational outcomes is stronger for low ability 
students, as it appeared in earlier works (Zimmer and Toma 2000; Vandenberghe 2002; Hanushek et al. 2003; 
Rangvid 2007; Schneeweiss and Winter-Ebmer 2007), or from high to average ability students, as more recent 
researches for the UK have shown (Gibbons and Telhaj 2008; Lavy et al. 2009). Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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larger and social stratification at school more likely to emerge
4. As a result, schools might 
turn out being more homogeneous not necessarily along an ability dimension (which under 
certain assumptions on the human capital production function can enhance the aggregate level 
of human capital
5) but along other dimensions with direct consequences for the allocation of 
talents
6. Teacher quality and resource allocation represent other channels through which 
school tracking might reinforce the dependence between student achievement and the family 
background. Specifically, better teachers could be attracted by the academic schools while 
vocational ones are likely to be endowed with relatively less resources (Brunello and Checchi 
2007)
7.  
Ability tracking represents another important policy affecting the peer group composition. 
The impact of this policy on the socio-economic gradient is however less clear even when 
abilities are partially correlated with family background. In principle, more homogenous 
classes reinforce students’ differences through peer effects and therefore increase the 
dispersion of students’ achievements. On the other hand, ability tracking might favour the 
homogenization of programs and teaching styles, hence increasing the outcomes of both low- 
and high-ability students with no clear consequences on educational inequality. In addition, 
the interaction of students which are too heterogeneous might favour the emergence of 
disruptive behaviour, such as envy, conflict or polarized behaviour. These contrasting forces 
might explain the disagreement of studies attempting to assess the relationship between ability 
tracking and educational inequality (Argys et al. 1996, Figlio and Page 2002, Rees et al. 2000, 
Betts and Shkolnik 2000a, 2000b; Zimmer 2003). 
It is worth noticing that tracking does not exhaust the set of policy features influencing 
students’ sorting and the dispersion of students’ achievements (Nechyba 2006, Waldinger 
2006). The sorting process is in fact constrained by other structural factors shaping individual 
choices. Admission procedures at the school level and residential segregation (strongly related 
to income through housing prices) could constrain students choices and make them more 
                                                            
4. However, educational systems with an early tracking age often puts vocational and specific training at the 
centre of their development strategy (Hall and Soskice 2001), hence vocational schools might attract also 
students with background above the average 
5. In particular: i) complementarity among similar ability types or equivalently convexity of the peer effects 
(Benabou 1996); ii) positive learning externalities brought about by a more homogeneous class; for instance 
because greater homogeneity eases teaching (Lazear 2001).  
6. On this point, the interesting paper of Checchi and Flabbi (2005) compares the criteria of admission to the 
academic track (preparatory to university education) in Italy and Germany. They found that in Germany the main 
criterion is ability, whereas in Italy unrestricted tracking renders parental background more important. 
7. The number of slots in academic schools also matters (Brunello and Checchi 2007, Brunello et al. 2007). 
Consistently with the model of Betts (1998), they show that a smaller number of slots in academic schools, 
equivalent to a higher standard for entering these schools, might decrease inequality as some high ability 
students end up in vocational schools.  Assessing students’equality of opportunity in OECD countries : the role of national and school-level policies 
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dependent on parental background (Durlauf 1994, Fernandez and Rogerson 1996). For 
instance, costs of mobility or limited number of slots in schools located in rich-neighbourhood 
could restrain the choice set of more motivated students from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Finally, parental and students’ idiosyncratic preferences are likely to generate a large amount 
of variability in the analysis of the determinants of peer group composition. 
In light of these considerations, tracking policies alone are likely to be an imperfect 
predictor of school peers composition, i.e. they could not be considered the main policies 
influencing the dispersion in students achievements. This motivates our claim of considering 
the joint impact of a broader set of educational policies affecting the peer group composition. 
 
3. Dataset and main variables 
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between peer group composition and the socio-
economic gradient using the 2006 release of the PISA survey, carried out by the OECD. This 
survey interviews 15 year-old students, using schools as principal sample units from which 
students are sampled at a second stage. Differently from other dataset such as TIMMS, the 
PISA survey focuses on cognitive problem solving skills and real world applications rather 
than on strictly curricular competences. PISA 2006 provides standardized scores on students’ 
capacities in three broad domains: math, science and reading.  
In this study, we focus on test scores in math for sake of comparability with the more 
closely related work (Schuetz et al. 2008, which, using TIMMS, analyze performances in 
math). For the same reason, we use the variable “number of books at home” as the proxy of 
the family background. Preliminary analyses available upon request show that, consistently 
with other studies using different datasets (Wößmann 2003, 2004), books outperform other 
possible family background variables, such as parental occupation or education, in explaining 
students’ achievements. In the PISA dataset, books at home are recorded through six 
categories, not directly providing a synthetic index. However, Schuetz et al (2008) show that 
this multinomial variable can be linearized without losing the explanatory power of the 
regression, so we follow them in doing this linearization. 
As measures of peer level variables at school-level
8, we use the average number of “books 
at home” among schoolmates, net of the individual one, and the standard deviation of the 
number of books at home among schoolmates, to capture possible non-linearities and the role 
of peer heterogeneity (Rangvid 2007, Raitano and Vona 2011). In order to partially account 
                                                            
8. Pisa does not provide information about students at the class-level; hence peer composition can be inferred at 
the school-level. Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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for cross-country differences in students’ sorting, peer heterogeneity is measured as the ratio 
between the standard deviation at the school level and the one computed at the country level. 
This normalization is required since peer heterogeneity at the school level could be inflated by 
higher background dispersion at the country level.  
Finally, the PISA dataset records several exogenous students’ characteristics – i.e. age, 
grade, gender, first- or second-generation immigrant –, whose averages at the school level 
(net of the individual one) represent other peer group composition variables potentially 
affecting students’ outcomes. In particular, the shares of first- and second-generation 
immigrants in the school encompass interesting characteristics of the school and the 
contextual environment, being probably higher in ghettoes or in less rich neighbourhoods.  
Concerning policies affecting the peer group composition, the literature has emphasized 
the importance of national policies setting the age of the first tracking among schools offering 
different curricula, i.e. academic vs. vocational, and the number of tracks available. However, 
there is no widespread agreement in the literature on the best way of measuring tracking 
policies
9. Here, we use two alternative measures: 1. the age of first tracking; 2. a dummy 
capturing the comprehensiveness of the educational systems, which is equal to one if the 
system tracks students before they are aged 13 and 0 otherwise (i.e. in more comprehensive 
systems)
10.  
Moreover, additional information on school-level policies potentially related to the peer 
group composition are available in the PISA dataset. Specifically, admission procedures (i.e. 
if the area of residence and the previous student record is a priority for being admitted in  the 
school) and ability tracking inside the school (available in the three modalities: none, in some 
subjects or in all subjects) determine the extent to which students with similar ability and 
background tend to be sorted in the same learning environment. Therefore, we build a set of 
what we call “sorting policies” potentially affecting peer level characteristics using dummies 
capturing partial and full ability tracking, admission through residence, admission through 
student record and, at the national level, school tracking policies.  
Finally, the socio-economic gradient could depend on several country-level educational 
policies and systemic features (Schuetz et al. 2008, Brunello and Checchi 2007): the duration 
of the pre-primary school and the enrolment share in it, the share of public expenditures in 
                                                            
9. Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) and Schuetz et al. (2008) use the age at which students first choose between 
academic-oriented and vocational schools, Ammermueller (2005) the number of different types of schools 
experienced by the student before enrolling in upper secondary education, Waldinger (2006) the minimum 
school grade at which a significant share of students is allocated in different tracks. 
10. Following this definition, early tracking countries are the following (see table 2): Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Switzerland, Hungary, Netherlands, Mexico, Slovakia and Turkey. Assessing students’equality of opportunity in OECD countries : the role of national and school-level policies 
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education, the enrolment rate in private schools, the per capita GDP and the per-capita 
spending in education. Table 1 provides further details on the variables used in this paper.  
 
4. Descriptive and preliminary analysis 
Equality of educational opportunities widely differs across countries and this fact 
represents the main motivation of our study. Differences are evident by carrying on by-
country OLS regressions of the math scores on “books at home” controlling for basic 
individual characteristics (grade, gender, age, first- and second-generation immigrants and 
considering interactions between the immigrant status and the background variable). 
Estimated coefficients of the “books at home variable” in single OECD countries are shown 
in figure 1. The estimated average FBE computed on PISA 2006 data appears slightly larger 
than the one found in the work of Schuetz et al. (2008) on TIMMS data by using the same 
control variables
11 – 21.2 versus 17.5 – but the country-ranking in term of FBE does not 
substantially differ between ours and their estimates. Interestingly, all countries having a FBE 
a full standard deviation above the average track students relatively earlier.  
This preliminary analysis seems to partially justify the approach followed by previous 
studies, which gave a prominent importance to tracking policies. However, looking at other 
sorting policies potentially affecting the peer group composition, namely proxies of ability 
tracking and of admission procedures followed by schools, it has to be noticed that their 
diffusion is far from being uniform across countries (table 2). Ability tracking is confirmed to 
be widely diffused in Anglo-Saxon countries (Epple et al. 2002, Betts and Shkolnik 2000a). 
In turn, the share of students admitted by residential location is generally higher in 
comprehensive systems, with distinct exceptions of Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg, 
Italy, Korea and Japan. Admission criteria based on student records are fairly prevalent in the 
early-tracking system and in Korea and Japan. 
Next step is to show that sorting policies affect the peer group composition along both the 
unobservable ability and the family background dimensions. Concerning the first – absent 
information on individual ability before school enrolment –, we proxy heterogeneity in ability 
within the school as the ratio between the standard deviation in test scores within the school 
and the standard deviation in test scores at the national level. From the theoretical insights 
discussed in previous sections, the ability dispersion within the same school should be: 1) 
higher in the comprehensive system, as between schools selection is absent; 2) lower if 
                                                            
11. This discrepancy could be due to the larger number of countries included in their dataset. Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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students are selected according to previous marks, as students turn out being more 
homogeneous; 3) higher in presence of ability tracking within the school, as it leads to 
polarization in attainments among classes; 4) ambiguous with respect to residential 
admission
12. Table 3 (column 2) shows regressions of our measure of ability heterogeneity on 
sorting policies, including country fixed effects. In spite of this limited number of controls, 
the explanatory power of the regression is above 40%. All sorting policies have the expected 
sign and are statistically significant. Interestingly, admission by residential location leads to a 
greater heterogeneity, probably because urban segregation is not particularly strong in the 
majority of countries considered.  
 A second check consists in analyzing how observable peer composition, based on family 
background of schoolmates, is affected by sorting policies. In table 3, column 3 and 4 show 
results obtained using the same specification as in column 2 considering, respectively, the 
school-level average and the normalized standard deviation of the book at home variable as 
dependent variables. The average peer level is significantly higher in comprehensive systems 
and lower when any other sorting policy is implemented, apart from the case of students 
chosen according to their previous records. Peer heterogeneity is significantly higher the later 
school tracking is and when admission depends on residence. Conversely, ability tracking 
seems to increase the heterogeneity in backgrounds when it regards some subjects. In general, 
sorting policies explain a decent fraction of the between school differences in peer group 
composition. However, especially for peer heterogeneity, still a large fraction is left 
unexplained including only these policies. The inadequacy of available sorting policies to deal 
with the issue of peer group endogeneity will be addressed in the next section. 
 
5. Empirical strategy 
Testing the effects of policies, both at the school- and country-level, on equality of 
opportunities can be carried out in two ways. A first possibility is to estimate the socio-
economic gradient by country and, in a second step, regresses it on national-wide educational 
policies. Alternatively, the interaction between the policy of interest and the FBE can be 
inserted in the student-level cross-country regressions. As Schuetz et al. (2008) pointed out, 
this strategy allows to relax the quite restrictive assumptions on the distributions of the 
residuals implicit in the two-stage regressions. For our purposes, an additional advantage of 
                                                            
12. This depends on the complex interlocked relationships between ability, family background and residential 
segregation. Assessing students’equality of opportunity in OECD countries : the role of national and school-level policies 
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this method consists in the possibility to add school-level variables to explain the process of 
inequality transmission.  
With respect to the work of Schuetz et al. (2008), we use a slightly modified version of the 
second approach considering school-level features together with country-level policies. In 
fact, within-country between-school differences contribute to explain large fractions of the 
dispersion in attainments and, being student’s attainments strongly related with family 
background, also explain a large fraction of the FBE.  
Moving from the claim that the peer group composition is the main factor affecting the 
dispersion of student achievements, we directly include school- and national-level policies 
and features related to the school composition. The preliminary analysis of the previous 
section suggests that sorting policies available in the PISA dataset partially predict peer level 
variables, both along an observable and an unobservable peer dimension. Likewise, the first 
step of our analysis consists in including interactions between these school-level policies Ssc 
and the family background proxy Bisc in a model where, following Schuetz et al. (2008), the 
achievement of student i in country c and school s also depend on a set of basic individual 
controls Xisc (age, gender, grade and immigrant status) and on country-level policies Pc:  
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) isc isc isc isc isc sc isc c sc c isc isc isc u m B I B S B P F P B X A + + + + + + + + + = * * * ϑ ν η λ δ γ β α  
where uisc is an independent error term and misc is a dummy equal 1 for imputed values of the 
books at home variable, built following the standard procedure as in Fuchs and Woessman 
(2007). Among student characteristics, family background Bisc is then affected by school- and 
country-level policies through their respective interaction terms. Furthermore, we interact the 
FBE with first- and second-generation immigrant status Iisc in order to capture the possibility 
that the FBE varies between natives and immigrants. The inclusion of country-level policies 
Pc is required to disentangle their impacts on equity from the one on efficiency. For the same 
reason, we add broad school fixed effects (Fsc), built as the deciles of the average background 
level of the students in school s of country c. These school-level effects roughly capture the 
quality of the school-specific learning environment. 
  In estimating equation (1) and all following specifications presented in this paper, 
individual observations are weighted for their sample probability. Besides, the hierarchical 
structure of the data is considered taking countries as the primary sampling units and applying 
cluster-robust linear regressions, which impose independence of observations across sample Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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units but any structure of the errors’ variance-covariance matrix for observations belonging to 
each unit
13.  
An important remark is in order here. Schuetz et al. (2008) excluded school-level 
characteristics from the empirical specification since, focusing only on cross-country 
comparison, they wanted to depurate the FBE from school-level features affecting the sorting 
of students to schools of different quality. Our empirical strategy is complementary to theirs 
as we attempt to quantify the importance of cross-country differences in school-level policies 
that are known to affect student sorting and the distribution of educational opportunities.  
However, as pointed out by Schuetz et al. (2008), results obtained estimating equation (1) 
could be driven by unobservable country-level characteristics affecting students’ sorting. 
Hence, following their suggestions, we run a second specification where country fixed effects 
Fc and their interactions with basic student characteristics Xisc are added. More precisely, we 
estimate: 
 (2)     ( ) ( ) ( )
() isc isc c isc c
isc isc isc sc isc c sc isc isc isc
u m F X F
B I B S B P F B X A
+ + +




ϑ ν η λ γ β α
  
As Schuetz et al. (2008) pointed out, this specification does not allow to identify the effect 
of country-level policies and features Pc, but it consents to assess how these policies affect the 
FBE under the assumption that unobservable cross-country heterogeneity is unrelated to the 
size of the FBE. This identification requirement appears more likely to be satisfied with our 
approach where, explicitly, within-country heterogeneity in school policies affecting sorting is 
controlled for. In a nutshell, since sorting policies are relevant determinants of FBE through 
peer group composition and substantially differ across countries (see table 2), there is still a 
fraction of unobservable cross-country heterogeneity that is not accounted for by policies and 
systemic features considered at the country-level. Therefore, adjusting for these school-level 
features reduces the bias associated to unobservable country features. 
However, the sorting policies are only an imperfect predictor of peer group composition, 
which is recognized to be the key factor shaping the distribution of educational opportunities. 
A more direct way to assess the impact of the peer variables on the socio-economic gradient 
consists in interacting peer variables with the FBE. In this case, the econometric 
specifications of eq. 1 and 2 become respectively: 
                                                            
13. In fact, in the PISA dataset, the primary sample units are schools. Since we use both school- and country-
level variables, the choice of the hierarchical structure is less clear. However, results available upon request 
show that nothing changes by taking schools as basic sample units in the cluster-robust regression.  Assessing students’equality of opportunity in OECD countries : the role of national and school-level policies 
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(1’)   ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) isc isc isc isc isc c
isc sc isc i sc sc c isc isc isc
u m B I B P
B B B B F P B X A
+ + + +




σ ω μ λ δ γ β α
   
(2’)     ( ) ( ) () ()
() () isc isc c isc c isc isc
isc sc isc i sc isc c sc isc isc isc
u m F X F B I
B B B B B P F B X A
+ + + + +




σ ω μ η λ γ β α
 
where the mean, net of the individual one, and the standard deviation of the number of books 
in the school are included. The difference in the explanatory power and in the results of these 
two (direct and indirect) estimation approaches captures the extent to which observable 
selection polices fully account for peer level variables. It is, however, worth to remark that 
peer effects are not precisely identified by our econometric strategy, so they are basically not 
distinguishable from broader contextual effects.  
However, insofar as sorting policies and broad school fixed effects are correlated with 
peer effects, an extended empirical specification including both sorting policies and peer 
variables would consent to mitigate the endogeneity of peer effects, hence reaching a more 
accurate identification. This extended specification is also useful to investigate if sorting 
policies capture other mechanisms affecting the FBE. For instance, after controlling for 
family background, ability tracking might reduce inequality as it allows high-ability students 




In table 4 model 1, following Schuetz et al. (2008), we present the benchmark 
specification with only country-level policies. Our results generally confirm theirs even if the 
effects of several policies appear now insignificant. Specifically, the effect of pre-school 
enrolment is inversely U-shaped, while the ones of duration of the pre-primary school, of 
GDP per capita and of the private enrolment share are all weakly negative. Only two country-
level policies appear to significantly affect the size of the FBE: a higher share of public 
expenditures in education has an equalizing effect as it is for postponing the age of first 
tracking. It is worth noticing that, compared to the TIMMS dataset used by Schuetz et al. 
(2008), the inequality-enhancing effect of early school tracking is here smaller and less Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
  14
significant
14. In particular, a one year postponement of the age of tracking leads to a 4.7% 
decrease of the average FBE. However, this result might be simply driven by the larger 
number of countries included in Schuetz et al. (2008) analysis.  
Model 2 of Table 4 reports results of the model with school selection policies and school 
fixed effects. A later track still reduces the FBE, but the effect is only weakly significant. 
Concerning school-level policies, ability tracking significantly reduces the FBE after 
controlling for family background, whereas admission policies based on students’ abilities 
increases it and residential location does not encompass any particular effect. Finally, a large 
27% increase in the explanatory power of the regressions occurs when moving from model 1 
to model 2
15. 
Another 8% improvement in the R
2 is obtained by including peer level variables, i.e. the 
average and the standard deviation of the number of books in the school, rather than sorting 
policies. Even more important, model 3 in table 4 shows that the inclusion of peer variables 
halves the size of the “autonomous” FBE (i.e. the coefficient of the individual books at home 
variable) whereas the mere inclusion of sorting policies leads to a much smaller 21% 
reduction in the FBE with respect to model 1. The linear peer effect appears stronger the 
higher the FBE, pointing to complementarity between good individual background and good 
school peers. In turn, peer heterogeneity has the theoretically expected equalizing effect at the 
95% significance level. With regards to the size of this effect, an increase in one standard 
deviation in peer heterogeneity accounts for 5.3% of the FBE and corresponds to 5.5% in 
terms of grade-equivalent. Moreover (model 4), the effect of age track turns out completely 
insignificant while the one of the early-tracking dummy declines but remains statistically 
significant
16. Finally, pre-school enrolment displays a plainly negative relationship with the 
FBE, consistent with studies showing the importance of pre-school education for worse-off 
students (Carneiro Heckman 2005; Garces et al. 2005; Currie 2001). When inserting pre-
school enrolment linearly instead than in a quadratic form, its equalizing effect is larger and 
significant with a 1% increase in pre-school enrolment leading to a 1.1 reduction in the FBE 
(see the third last row in table 4).  
                                                            
14. The effect of tracking is significant at 95% if we use the early-tracking dummy partitioning the educational 
systems in early and non-early tracking and only at 90% if we use the age of first tracking, as in Schuetz et al. (2008). 
15. The two models are not fully comparable as we do not have school information for France, which is missing 
in all models with sorting policies, namely models 2, 5 and 6 of table 4 and models 8, 11 and 12 of table 5.The 
same caveat holds in comparing the model with peer variables, e.g. model 3 of table 4, and the model with 
sorting policies, e.g. model 2 of table 4. However, dropping France in all models does not alter the main results 
as shown in additional material available upon request. 
16. In spite of the strong correlation between our two ways of measuring school tracking, the early-tracking 
variable appears to capture additional features of the educational system positively correlated with the FBE. Assessing students’equality of opportunity in OECD countries : the role of national and school-level policies 
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Results of fully-fledged models, when we enrich the model 4 with either school tracking 
or the full set of sorting policies, are shown in table 4, models 5-6, respectively. In both 
models 5 and 6, our main variables of interest remain of similar sizes and at same significance 
levels, with the exception of the admittance by residence that now exerts a significant impact 
on inequality of opportunity. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of other attributes of 
the peer group composition, such as the share of females and the ones of first and second-
generation immigrants, which are not statistically significant (model 6).  
 
Country Fixed Effect Specification  
A tougher test of our results consists in replacing the linear country-level policies with a 
full set of country and country per student fixed effects and in re-estimating models 1-6 (table 
5, models 7-12). This specification is our favourite one as it encompasses several 
unobservable features of the education system that might render indistinguishable the effect of 
targeted policies on equity and efficiency. As would be expected, the R
2 of country fixed 
effect models is substantially higher than the one of basic models (compare table 4 and table 
5). Looking across table 5, the size of the autonomous FBE appears much smaller than in the 
basic models of table 4.  
Concerning our main variables of interest, school tracking stops having any significant impact 
on the FBE already in the benchmark model 7 and independently on the way used to measure 
it. School sorting policies exert the same kind of impact shown in table 4 – apart from the 
admittance by residence which is not significant also when peer composition variables are 
added – whereas country-level policies are never significant. Even if slightly smaller with 
respect to the basic specification, a one-percent increase in pre-school enrolment brings about 
a decline in the FBE which ranges between 0.67 and 0.96. Another interesting result emerges 
looking at the model with peer variables, i.e. model 9. In the country fixed effect 
specification, peer heterogeneity increases its effect on students’ scores: an increase in one 
standard deviation of peer heterogeneity leads to a larger 8.4% decrease in the average FBE. 
In turn, linear peer remains significant, but almost halves in size.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper extends previous analyses on the relationship between students’ equality of 
opportunities and characteristics of the educational system, jointly considering country- and 
school-level features. With respect to previous studies, tracking policies appear much less Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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important up to become statistically insignificant when either other sorting policies at the 
school level or peer variables are included in the analysis.  
However, policies affecting students’ sorting do not fully account for the peer group 
composition. This explains why the influence of peer group composition on the FBE, also if 
not perfectly identified, remains largely significant in spite of the inclusion of a full set of 
sorting policies and increases the explanatory power of the model. Consistent with the 
theoretical literature, peer heterogeneity reduces the FBE, especially in our favourite country 
fixed-effect specification. With regards to school sorting policies, ability tracking appears to 
reduce the FBE across different empirical specifications. 
These results enable us to drawn two main insights for future works. First, the effect of 
school tracking is mainly captured by its indirect effect on the peer group composition. But 
the opposite is not true as determinants of the peer group composition and especially of its 
relationship with the FBE remains largely unexplained. Unfortunately, identifying the impact 
of each sorting policy on the FBE via the peer group composition cannot be carried out in 
absence of a comprehensive set of sorting policies, both at the national and at the 
neighbourhood-school-level. These considerations bring us directly to the second practical 
insight derived from our analysis. We claim that, being absent detailed information on 
policies affecting student sorting, an ex-post direct specification of the relationship between 
the socio-economic gradient and the peer variables is a useful policy instrument. Rather than 
general conclusions on how each policy affects educational opportunities, our analysis could 
be useful to policy-makers for setting a target level of peer variables and then searching 
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Tab. 1: Control variables used in regressions  
School sorting policies 
Residence  Dummy variable showing if residence is a prerequisite or a high priority for being admitted to the school 
Student record  Dummy variable showing if previous academic records (or a specific test) are a prerequisite or a high priority for being admitted to the school 
Full sorting by ability  Dummy variable showing if students are grouped according to their abilities within schools for all subjects  
Partial sorting by ability  Dummy variable showing if students are grouped according to their abilities within schools for some subjects 
School composition 
Share of females  Share of females among schoolmates  
Share of first generation immigrants  Share of first generation immigrants among schoolmates 
Share of second generation immigrants  Share of second generation immigrants among schoolmates 
Books average  Average level of the “books at home” variable among schoolmates  
Books standard deviation  Standard deviation (corrected for the country “books at home” standard deviation) of the “books at home” variable at school 
Country-level policies  
Gdp per capita  Average 2000-2005, source Oecd dataset 
Spending in education per capita  Average 2000-2005, source UNESCO dataset 
Age of first track  Source Brunello and Checchi (2007) 
Early_track  Dummy variable: 1 if school track occurs before age 13, 0 otherwise 
Duration of pre-primary schools  In years, source UNESCO dataset 
Enrolment to pre-primary schools  Share of students enrolled to pre-primary, 1993-95 UNESCO dataset  
Public expenditure share  Share of the spending on education coming from public sources, 2000-2005 average, source Oecd dataset 




Grade  Students below grade 8 and beyond grade 11 are excluded from the sample; hence, grade is captured by 3 dummies 
First generation immigrant  Dummy variable showing if the student is a first generation immigrant 
Second generation immigrant  Dummy variable showing if the student is a second generation immigrant 
Books at home  Multinomial variable with six categories recording the number of books at home: less than 11, 11-25, 26-100, 101-200, 201-500, more than 500  
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Fig 1: Estimated family background effect on math scores in OECD countries. Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data
FBE Mean + 1 S.D. Mean Mean ‐ 1 S.D.
 
 
Table 2: Sorting policies at school-level in OECD countries and age of first track 
  Share admitted by 
residence 
Share admitted by 
students’ records 
Share of ability 
track in all subjects
Share of ability 
track in some 
subjects 
Share of no 
ability track 
Age of first 
track 
Number of sample 
observations 
Australia 41.9  9.4  4.7  89.9  5.4  16  14,666 
Austria 21.5  68.9  3.4  36.9  59.8  10  4,807 
Belgium 2.4  25.9  22.0  22.0  56.0  12  9,078 
Canada 78.0  10.4  13.3  78.4  8.3  16  22,484 
Switzerland 81.7  53.3  41.5  33.9  24.6  12  11,610 Michele Raitano et Francesco Vona 
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Czech Republic  19.7  44.8  12.3  53.1  34.6  11  5,732 
Germany 65.2  39.6  10.8  30.5  58.7  10  4,762 
Denmark 55.5  3.3  7.4  76.7  16.0  16  4,568 
Spain 68.2  3.2  15.4  55.9  28.7  16  20,297 
Finland 75.5  4.3  2.1  48.0  49.9  16  4,875 
France n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  15  4,767 
UK 60.8  9.7  8.3  91.4  0.3  16  13,389 
Greece 71.1  4.8  0.7  10.2  89.1  15  4,834 
Hungary 1.4  70.2  1.7  67.5  30.9  11  4,401 
Ireland 42.8  2.6  7.0  90.9  2.1  15  4,722 
Iceland 94.5  1.0  6.6  78.3  15.2  16  3,496 
Italy 11.1  6.6  21.4  24.9  53.7  14  22,098 
Japan 20.4  86.5  9.9  46.0  44.1  15  6,123 
Korea 22.1  60.2  7.1  81.1  11.7  14  5,323 
Luxembourg 42.4  41.4  46.0  27.0  27.1  13  4,743 
Mexico 11.3  41.9  27.9  43.4  28.8  12  29,219 
Netherlands 10.3  65.7  48.2  33.2  18.6  12  5,053 
Norway 79.0  0.0  2.7  39.2  58.1  16  4,747 
New Zealand  49.8  9.7  5.9  91.1  3.0  16  4,677 
Poland 82.8  13.2  3.3  43.7  53.1  16  5,613 
Portugal 56.3  6.2  12.1  39.7  48.2  15  4,740 
Slovakia 17.3  49.9  16.0  59.3  24.7  11  4,537 
Sweden 58.8  0.6  5.0  70.3  24.7  16  4,486 
Turkey 35.0  30.5  18.4  21.6  60.0  11  5,002 
US 80.8  8.1  7.6  80.1  12.3  16  5,760 
Mean values and  
total obs  46.8 26.6  13.4  53.9  32.7  14  250,609 
Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data 
 Assessing students’equality of opportunity in OECD countries : the role of national and school-level policies 
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Table 3: Determinants of school composition and heterogeneity in scores in math in OECD countries 
  Dependent variable 
  School standard deviation  
in scores in math 
School average  
parental background 
School standard deviation of  
 parental background 
age track  0.024***  0.062***  0.017*** 
residence 0.033***  -0.133***  0.018*** 
student records  -0.024***  0.260***  -0.015*** 
full sorting by ability  0.023***  -0.098***  -0.010 
partial sorting by ability  0.021*** -0.027* 0.020*** 
Number of observations  7,425  7,425  7,425 
R
2 0.412  0.439  0.293 
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Table 4: Students scores in maths in OECD countries: student-level interaction specification without country fixed effects
1.  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
books  83.79*** 65.99*** 41.37**  38.91*  37.25*  36.43* 
books*schoolmates books average      10.41*** 10.38*** 10.19*** 10.27*** 
books*schoolmates books st. dev.      -5.47* -5.45* -5.51* -5.46* 
books*share of female  sc.mates        -0.19 
books*share of first gen. immig. sc.mates           3.19 
books*share of sec. gen. immig. sc.mates           4.50 
books*full sorting by ability    -3.72***     -3.05*** -3.05*** 
books*partial sorting by ability    -2.14**     -2.33*** -2.34*** 
books*student records    5.40*     4.91*** 4.97*** 
books*residence   1.43     1.99*** 1.95*** 
books*age track  -1.02* -1.33*    -0.45  -0.89  -0.88 
books*enrol preprimary  16.58 45.20 -9.36 -0.86 17.76  17.94 
books*enrol preprimary^2  -15.06 -41.18 1.04  -6.94 -25.20  -25.34 
books*gdp per capita/1000  -0.10 0.67** 0.23  0.18 0.74**  0.72** 
books*educ. spending per student/1000  -0.16 -2.61*  -1.71 -1.43  -3.10***  -3.08*** 
books*duration preprimary  -0.33 0.74  -0.96  -0.83  0.24 0.28 
books*public expenditure share  -47.20*** -45.97** -39.95**  -33.32*  -36.00*  -35.60* 
books*private enrolment share  -0.49 1.65  -3.20  -1.51  0.57 0.62 
age track  -1.00 4.50  -3.55  -1.98  1.32 1.38 
enrol preprimary  121.90 -53.12  168.83**  140.02*  57.55 56.18 
enrol preprimary^2  -91.37 77.64  -124.53  -97.54  -14.71  -13.18 
gdp per capita/1000  -4.37*  -6.07*** -4.76**  -4.60** -5.92*** -5.92** 
educational spending per student/1000  17.68**  23.59*** 19.63*** 18.67*** 22.34*** 22.33*** 
duration preprimary  3.55  -3.45 3.61 3.13 -2.06 -2.14 
public expenditure share  224.23  191.64 212.88 189.90 185.59 185.42 
private enrolment share  64.71 53.95  74.70*  69.21  57.77  57.49 
books*early  track  5.93** 5.96*    4.29* 4.97* 4.83* 
books*enrol  preprimary  -4.72  -2.08  -11.23** -12.23** -12.53** -12.46** 
Number of observations  245,036  227,670 245,036 245,036 227,670 227,670 
R
2  0.266  0.337 0.364 0.364 0.362 0.362 
1 In all models the following control variables at the individual level are included: age, gender, attended grade, two dummies if first or second generation immigrants and two 
interactions between the immigrant dummies and the number of books at home. Apart from model 1, school level fixed effects are included (i.e. a dummy equal 1 for the decile of 
the country specific distribution of the average parental background at which the school belongs to). Regressions are run by clustering (by countries) robust standard errors and 




Table 5: Students scores in maths in OECD countries: student-level interaction specification with country fixed effects
1. 
  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12 
books  48.76*** 35.86* 31.48**  31.37**  31.17**  31.27** 
books*schoolmates books average     4.26***  4.26***  4.02***  4.02*** 
books*schoolmates books st. dev.     -8.62**  -8.62**  -7.92**  -7.95** 
books*share of female sc.mates          0.19 
books*share of first gen. immig. sc.mates          2.52 
books*share of sec. gen. immig. sc.mates          -1.51 
books*full sorting by ability   -2.08***     -2.11***  -2.12*** 
books*partial sorting by ability   -1.84***     -1.58**  -1.58** 
books*student records   4.13***     3.64***  3.64*** 
books*residence   -0.50     0.08  0.08 
books*age track  -0.43 0.34    -0.02  0.18  0.17 
books*enrol preprimary  -8.47 -18.18  -14.07 -13.68 -14.33 -14.29 
books*enrol preprimary^2  1.20 8.80 4.17  3.81  3.44  3.32 
books*gdp per capita/1000  0.04 0.28 0.23  0.22  0.39  0.39 
books*educ. spending per student/1000  0.45 -0.16  -0.42 -0.41  -0.81  -0.81 
books*duration preprimary  0.28 0.26  -0.26 -0.26 -0.03 -0.02 
books*public expenditure share  -23.57 -28.30 -16.56  -16.26  -20.95  -21.08 
books*private enrolment share  1.60 0.42 0.55  0.62  0.38  0.43 
books*early track  0.13  -2.42    -0.65  -1.32  -1.31 
books*enrol preprimary  -6.41  -8.34**  -9.20***  -9.39***  -10.49***  -10.59*** 
Number of observations  245,036 227,670 245,036  245,036  227,670  227,670 
R
2  0.351 0.414 0.427  0.427  0.419  0.419 
1 In all models the following control variables at the individual level are included: age, gender, attended grade, two dummies if first or second generation immigrants and two 
interactions between the immigrant dummies and the number of books at home. Further, country fixed effects and the interactions between country fixed effects and all the individual 
level variables are included. Apart from model 1, school level fixed effects are included (i.e. a dummy equal 1 for the decile of the country specific distribution of the average 
parental background at which the school belongs to). Regressions are run by clustering (by countries) robust standard errors and weighting by students’ sampling probabilities. 
Significance level: *** 99%; ** 95%; * 90%. Source: elaborations on PISA (2006) 
 